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ExAMInIng STRATEgIc FIT AnD MISFIT In ThE 
MAnAgEMEnT OF KnOwlEDgE wORKERS
chRISTOPhER cOllInS AnD REBEccA KEhOE*
This study advances research on strategic human resource 
management by examining whether better firm performance 
depends on the alignment between an organization’s human 
resources (hR) system and its innovation strategy. The authors argue 
that the unique problems underlying exploration innovation 
strategies and exploitation innovation strategies require core workers 
to engage in different types of knowledge-search and -combination 
behaviors. Alternative hR systems theoretically produce different 
knowledge-search and -combination behaviors by way of their effect 
on employees’ ability, motivation, and opportunity structures at 
work. Drawing on a field study of 230 software firms, the authors 
demonstrate that alternative hR systems support either an 
exploration or exploitation strategy and that alignment between a 
firm’s hR system and innovation strategy results in firm performance 
gains and misalignment results in performance penalties.
Knowledge exchange and combination are essential for innovation and firm survival in fast-paced industries (Smith, collins, and clark 2005), 
but not all formal arrangements for managing workers are equally effective 
in managing required knowledge outcomes (nickerson and Zenger 2004). 
Because alternative innovation strategies require the application of different 
knowledge (March 1991; Benner and Tushman 2003), the question of how 
firms can foster the required employee knowledge-search and -integration 
activities for a given innovation strategy is a critical area in need of further 
research (gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006). human resources (hR) systems 
may be key to understanding this question in that extant research suggests 
that firms can gain a competitive advantage when they achieve alignment 
between the behavioral requirements of their strategies and the role behav-
iors engendered by the hR systems they use to manage core employees 
(Schuler and Jackson 1987; collins and Smith 2006). we argue that firms 
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that choose an hR system that fits with the knowledge requirements of their 
innovation strategy will achieve higher firm performance whereas those that 
choose a poor-fitting hR system will suffer performance penalties.
Theoretical work in the strategic human resource management (ShRM) 
literature has argued for the importance of vertical fit, the notion that an 
hR system is more likely to positively contribute to firm performance when 
the system is aligned with an organization’s business strategy (Delery 1998; 
Becker and huselid 2006). Prior empirical studies, however, found mixed 
support for this fit hypothesis (e.g., Delery 1998). Furthermore, the extant 
empirical research testing the fit hypothesis is lacking on a number of 
dimensions. First, prior studies have tended to focus on manufacturing or 
low-end service firms or on frontline employees (e.g., Arthur 1994; Fu et al. 
2015), ignoring knowledge workers and industries in which innovation is at 
a premium. Second, prior work has tended to compare the effects of a high-
investment hR system oriented toward employee development (e.g., the 
high-commitment or high-performance hR system) to a lower-investment 
hR system that limits resource allocations directed to attracting and devel-
oping employees (e.g., a transactional approach) (e.g., Arthur 1994; Delery 
and Doty 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; Tsui, Pearce, Porter, 
and Tripoli 1997). Alternatively, extant empirical research has focused on 
the relative effects of a single strategic hR system in different strategic or 
industry contexts (e.g., youndt, Snell, Dean, and lepak 1996; chadwick, 
way, Kerr, and Thacker 2013). Unfortunately, although this body of research 
helps to establish boundary conditions associated with the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of a particular investment-oriented hR system,1 these prior 
studies have ignored the idea that organizations have the strategic choice 
among multiple different investment-oriented hR systems, each comprising 
hR practices that support the development of unique abilities, motivations, 
and opportunities (AMOs) by core knowledge workers (Kehoe and collins 
2008). As a result, this research has offered no insights regarding the rela-
tive effectiveness of a high-commitment approach relative to other strategic 
hR systems.
we contribute to the literature on ShRM in several important ways. First, 
we explicitly adopt the idea of strategic choice in hR by comparing three 
alternative systems of hR practices and their effectiveness in satisfying the 
knowledge requirements of exploration and exploitation innovation strate-
gies. Second, our approach sheds light on the fit hypothesis by assessing a 
wider range of hR systems and examining the effects of both alignment and 
misalignment of these hR systems with the knowledge-search and -combination 
behaviors required for the effective pursuit of alternative innovation 
 1For example, such research has established that high-investment hR practices may have diminishing 
positive effects on establishment performance as implementation levels increase (chadwick 2007); that 
the effect of high-performance hR practices on labor productivity may be more positive in firms that are 
not pursuing a differentiation strategy, when capital intensity is high, when industry dynamism is high, 
and when industry growth is high (chadwick et al. 2013); and that a human capital–enhancement hR 
system may be more positively related to performance under a quality manufacturing strategy (youndt et al. 
1996).
310 IlR REvIEw
strategies. Significantly, we articulate how the three hR systems build on 
alternative philosophical approaches for managing core knowledge workers 
in terms of attachment, selection, and coordination and control and how 
these choices should theoretically result in different arrays of employee 
AMOs to carry out the knowledge-search and -combination behaviors 
required for alternative innovation strategies. In this article, we develop the-
oretical arguments regarding the fit between alternative hR systems and 
innovation strategies. we start by outlining two alternative innovation strate-
gies—exploration and exploitation—and exploring the unique knowledge-
search and -combination requirements of each. we then present three 
alternative hR systems (engineering, bureaucratic, and commitment hR 
systems) and detail how each may be aligned or misaligned with the unique 
knowledge requirements of exploration and exploitation. we test our model 
with data collected from core knowledge workers and managers from a sam-
ple of 230 software firms.
Theory and Hypotheses
Exploration and Exploitation
Exploration and exploitation represent distinct alternative strategies for inno-
vation that enable firms to adapt to changing environments (gupta et al. 2006); 
they differ in the scope and nature of required learning activities and desired 
outcomes (levinthal and March 1993). Previous research has highlighted that 
the unique learning and knowledge requirements of these two strategies war-
rant distinct organizational investments, structures, and work environments 
(March 1991). Building on this prior work, we articulate the unique character-
istics of the knowledge-search and -exchange behaviors required of core knowl-
edge workers for successful exploration and exploitation.
Exploration has been broadly conceptualized as innovation with a goal of 
shifting or expanding a firm’s technological paradigm and often creating 
new products or entering new markets (levinthal and March 1993; Benner 
and Tushman 2003). Exploratory learning is characterized by the search for 
and combination of diverse and unique knowledge, risk-taking, experimen-
tation, discovery, and frequent change (March 1991; Katila and Ahuja 
2002). Exploration involves tasks that depart from the existing expertise of 
the focal organizational unit, requiring the organization to expand its base 
of knowledge and competence (Benner and Tushman 2003; Taylor and 
greve 2006). Extending this logic, firms successfully pursuing exploration 
depend on core knowledge workers with the AMOs that enable them to 
search for, acquire, and integrate diverse distal knowledge from unique 
sources (Rodan and galunic 2004; Beckman 2006). Employees’ knowledge-
search and -combination behaviors must also involve challenging the status 
quo through experimentation with novel alternatives that may vary widely 
from the firm’s current technological direction (Benner and Tushman 
2003).
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In contrast, exploitation has been defined as innovation with the goal of 
improving or reinforcing a firm’s current technological direction (Benner 
and Tushman 2003); it is oriented toward the refinement and extension of 
existing products (levinthal and March 1993; he and wong 2012). In tar-
geting innovation around existing technologies, firms pursuing exploita-
tion require deep (rather than broad) searches for knowledge and benefit 
from the recombination of local or similar (rather than novel) information 
(Baum, li, and Usher 2000; Taylor and greve 2006). Firms pursuing exploi-
tation thus benefit from narrow overlapping knowledge and localized 
searches (either inside the organization or through other firms in the indus-
try) for knowledge that can be readily connected to refine and extend exist-
ing products, technologies, and routines (Benner and Tushman 2003; he 
and wong 2012). The knowledge-search and -combination behaviors that 
are likely to best support an exploitation strategy involve the application of 
knowledge that is more similar to and/or related to an organization’s exist-
ing knowledge domain (Katila and Ahuja 2002; Rodan and galunic 2004) 
and that supports more incremental change consistent with a firm’s current 
technological trajectory (March 1991; gupta et al. 2006).
The Behavioral Perspective of SHRM and an  
Examination of Alternative HR Systems
Early ShRM theory suggested that an organization can achieve a competi-
tive advantage when the firm’s hR system aligns with the requirements of 
the organization’s strategic goals (Dyer 1985; Schuler and Jackson 1987). 
Following the AMOs framework, employees’ contributions to performance 
are a function of their combined AMOs to achieve desired outcomes (Appel-
baum, Baily, Berg, and Kalleberg 2000; Jiang, lepak, hu, and Baer 2012). 
Integrating these insights at the organizational level, the behavioral per-
spective of ShRM suggested that an hR system can aid in the creation of 
competitive advantage for an organization to the extent that its hR prac-
tices elicit the specific role behaviors required by a firm’s strategy (Schuler 
and Jackson 1987; Jackson, Schuler, and Jiang 2014).
A key implication of the behavioral perspective is that hR systems com-
posed of different hR practices are likely to foster the AMOs of different 
employees to support the different role behaviors required of alternative 
organizational strategies (Kehoe and collins 2008). Prior ShRM research, 
however, adopted a narrow focus on a single hR system (the high-commit-
ment hR system), assessing its potential to support performance across a 
range of strategic and organizational contexts requiring a variety of 
employee role behaviors. we suggest this approach may be problematic 
because it provides a limited perspective on what may constitute a high-
investment hR system, particularly because a multitude of alternative hR 
systems may exist that follow different philosophies for investing in employ-
ees and developing unique employee AMOs (Kehoe and collins 2008). 
Moreover, a focus on a single hR system prevents scholars from 
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determining the unique hR management investments that differentiate 
organizations and enable a competitive advantage in different strategic con-
texts (Becker and huselid 2006).
we seek to overcome this critical limitation of prior ShRM research with 
an examination of the fit of different hR systems with alternative innovation 
strategies as a function of the knowledge-search and -combination behav-
iors that each hR system is likely to support. This represents an important 
point of departure, not only from the broader ShRM literature but also 
from prior ShRM work that specifically examined hR management and 
innovation, which has, to date, focused on the extent to which variations of 
the high-commitment hR system positively influence firms’ innovation per-
formance (e.g., collins and Smith 2006; chen and huang 2009; Patel, Mess-
ersmith, and lepak 2013; chuang, Jackson, and Jiang 2016). This body of 
research has also failed to distinguish the differential behavioral and hR 
management requirements of alternative innovation strategies, leaving a 
gap in our understanding of different AMO requirements across alternative 
innovation strategies and, consequently, the potential effectiveness of alter-
native hR systems in different contexts.
In reality, firms vary in their choice of hR systems (Ichniowski et al. 1997; 
Tsui et al. 1997). Even in knowledge-based firms that face high institutional 
pressures to develop similar hR systems, researchers have found consider-
able variability in the hR approaches for managing core employees (Sherer 
1995; Baron, Burton, and hannan 1999). Prior research has demonstrated 
that different systems of hR practices can shape firms’ performance out-
comes, not only with respect to performance levels but also by differentially 
influencing the specific behaviors and interactions underlying employees’ 
completion of work (Ichniowski and Shaw 2003). Therefore, researchers 
can expand our understanding of how firms can systematically and effec-
tively use hR management to support different strategies by simultaneously 
examining multiple systems that pursue unique avenues for investing in 
employee AMOs. we draw on the work of Baron and colleagues (Baron, 
Burton, and hannan 1996; Baron and hannan 2002) to identify three spe-
cific hR systems, each composed of a set of hR practices characterizing a 
distinct underlying philosophy for managing knowledge workers: engineer-
ing, bureaucratic, and commitment. Baron et al. (1996) found that the hR 
systems employed in the technology firms they studied varied on three key 
components: selection, attachment, and coordination and control. Firms 
adopt hR practices to support the underlying basis on which they would 
like each of these three components to be enacted. These three compo-
nents are consistent with other researchers’ descriptions of the elements 
underlying firms’ approaches to managing and shaping the AMOs of a 
workforce through hR practices (Tsui et al. 1997; Batt 2002).
The selection component captures whether an organization employs a 
buy or build approach with respect to employee capabilities, with firms vary-
ing in whether they hire employees based on their 1) skills and abilities to 
perform specific tasks right away, 2) broad capabilities to perform a range of 
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tasks that will evolve over time, or 3) fit to the culture of the firm with a 
focus on developing employees as they stay with the firm (Baron et al. 1996). 
The attachment component reflects the basis on which a firm attracts, 
retains, and motivates employees. Baron et al. (1996) noted that knowledge-
based firms differ in whether they build employees’ attachment through the 
development of 1) a long-term relationship based on employee commit-
ment to the organization itself, 2) a market-based relationship focused on 
providing interesting and challenging work, or 3) a market-based relation-
ship emphasizing individual pay.
Finally, coordination and control captures the mechanisms through 
which a firm manages employee performance, and structures work to ensure 
that essential tasks are completed effectively. Baron et al. (1996) noted that 
two broad approaches to coordination in knowledge-based firms were char-
acterized by autonomy or tight control, and that each of these approaches 
could be employed through two alternative paths. Firms can motivate high 
employee task performance through autonomy and empowerment based 
on 1) organizational culture and pressure from peers or 2) professional 
socialization tied to the academic and industry standards of professionally 
trained employees (Baron and hannan 2002). Firms pursuing a path of 
tight control and coordination can do so through 1) formal processes and 
systems or 2) consistent direct oversight by managers and supervisors (Baron 
et al. 1996).
Although the variation across the three components could lead to 36 
unique hR systems, Baron and colleagues (Baron et al. 1996; Baron and 
hannan 2002) found that most firms clustered into a small number of pat-
terns. Important for our study is that three hR systems—engineering, 
bureaucratic, and commitment—were by far the most consistently followed 
patterns for firms that had moved past the startup stage (Baron et al. 1999). 
The work of Baron and colleagues is helpful in identifying the key compo-
nents of hR systems and how the three systems differ from one another; 
nevertheless, previous research did not examine the impact of these systems 
on firm performance in the context of different innovation strategies. The 
three components (the bases for selection, attachment, and coordination 
and control) underlying each hR system are summarized in Table 1, and 
the specific AMOs and the ultimate role behaviors that they elicit are sum-
marized in Table 2.
The engineering, commitment, and bureaucratic hR systems explored 
here represent three distinct philosophies regarding hR management 
investments that are likely to foster different knowledge-worker AMOs based 
on the unique hR practices in each system. we emphasize that these three 
hR systems represent not variations in organizations’ levels of investment 
but, rather, variations in the types of investments that organizations make in 
managing the employment relationship, and they are likely to be more or 
less effective in supporting the knowledge-search and -combination require-
ments of alternative innovation strategies. Thus, in building and testing our 
theoretical model, we not only build on the ShRM research specifically 
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examining hR management and innovation but we also make a significant 
contribution to the broader ShRM literature by looking beyond the high-
commitment hR system to assess the effectiveness of alternative hR systems 
that may be more likely to contribute to competitive advantage in different 
strategic contexts.
Table 1. comparison of Three components underlying the Engineering, 
Bureaucratic, and commitment hR Systems
HR system Attachment Selection Coordination and control
Engineering hR  
system
Interesting, 
challenging work
“Buy” approach; 
selection for broad 
capabilities to 
perform a range of 
tasks that will evolve 
over time
Professional 
socialization
Bureaucratic hR 
system
competitive individual 
pay
“Buy” approach; 
selection for abilities 
to perform specific 
tasks right away
Formal processes and 
systems
commitment hR 
system
commitment to the 
organization
“Build” approach; 
selection for fit to 
organization’s 
culture
Organizational culture 
and pressure from 
peers
Table 2. hR Systems; Role Behaviors; and Abilities, Motivation, and Opportunities
HR system Ability Motivation Opportunity
Role behavior 
supported
Engineering hR 
system
Diverse, 
specialized 
knowledge
Motivation to 
navigate diverse 
viewpoints to 
achieve novel 
solutions
Ongoing access to 
diverse, distal 
knowledge in 
firm’s external 
environment
novel integration 
and 
recombination 
of diverse, distal 
knowledge
Bureaucratic hR 
system
Deep, narrow 
knowledge of 
industry 
standards and 
routines
Motivation to 
contribute to 
goals espoused 
by supervisor
Access to local 
knowledge 
related to 
current 
industry 
standards and 
routines
Integration and 
application of 
local, related 
knowledge in 
pursuit of 
incremental 
change
commitment hR 
system
Deep familiarity 
with 
organizational 
knowledge
commitment to 
achieving 
current goals of 
organization
Opportunities for 
reinforcement 
of shared or 
related 
knowledge and 
commitment to 
status quo 
through close 
contact with 
colleagues
Integration and 
application of 
local, related 
knowledge in 
pursuit of 
incremental 
change
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Engineering HR System
The engineering hR system has been identified as the default approach in 
the high-technology sector, with a focus on attracting diverse external talent 
with a broad range of specialized knowledge and fostering an environment 
in which employees test and challenge one another’s ideas (Baron and han-
nan 2002). The philosophical approach to hR practices underlying the 
engineering hR system is 1) selection based on a “buy” approach to hiring 
for diverse skills and knowledge rather than building them internally; 2) 
attracting and motivating employees (attachment) by providing interesting 
and challenging work, as well as personal development opportunities; and 
3) an autonomous approach to coordination and control relying on profes-
sional standards and socialization. Specifically, firms employing the engi-
neering hR system tend to foster a market-based employment relationship 
with employees; these firms implement a “buy” approach to recruitment 
and selection with a focus on acquiring external talent with a broad array of 
expertise and diverse experience at all levels of the organization (Kehoe 
and collins 2008). In addition, the engineering hR system elicits employee 
motivation and attachment by providing ample opportunities for employees 
to pursue interesting and challenging work, and by motivating employees to 
stay current with new advances in knowledge and technologies in the firm’s 
external environment. The engineering hR system relies on professional 
control to guide individual performance and discretion (Baron et al. 1996).
we argue that the combination of hR practices in the engineering hR sys-
tem promote unique knowledge-worker AMOs that support knowledge-
search and -combination behaviors that are aligned with the exploration 
strategy and misaligned with the exploitation strategy. First, employee selec-
tion practices in the engineering hR system are likely to support behaviors 
that lead to the continuous infusion of new and unique knowledge into the 
firm. For example, a focus on the external selection of top candidates with 
broad skills helps to increase the likelihood of these firms attracting diverse 
talent with specialized and often unique knowledge from top universities and 
organizations outside the industry (Kehoe and collins 2008). A market-based 
approach to selection ensures the perpetuation of inflows of new and unique 
knowledge through the hiring process at all levels of the organization (Song, 
Almeida, and wu 2003). This particular market-based approach also creates 
opportunities for incumbent knowledge workers to access new, unique, and 
diverse knowledge by drawing on their broad and diverse networks outside 
the organization and its immediate industry (Smith et al. 2005).
Second, the hR practices within the engineering hR system are also likely 
to motivate knowledge workers to enact the requisite knowledge-search and 
-combination behaviors for exploration. For example, firms following the 
engineering hR system provide general directions and end goals, but leave 
immediate decisions and paths to solve challenges up to the discretion of 
employees. In such an environment, which encourages the self-guided and 
creative search for knowledge and ideas rather than following standard 
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routines and protocols, knowledge workers will be more likely to conduct 
novel searches for relevant knowledge within and outside the firm (Amabile 
1996). Further, coordination and control based on professionalism and 
empowerment decreases status hierarchies and creates a climate in which 
employees believe no one person’s knowledge is more relevant to every 
problem or goal, probably increasing employees’ willingness to challenge 
the status quo (weick and westley 1996). Knowledge workers under this hR 
system will, therefore, be more likely to challenge previous assumptions, 
offer new ideas, and follow novel search directions to solve problems. The 
engineering hR system’s focus on adhering to professional standards and 
the selection of skilled specialized talent is likely to increase feelings of trust 
among employees in the firm, increasing the motivation to share unique 
knowledge with one another (collins and Smith 2006).
Overall, the engineering hR system fosters many of the knowledge-search 
and -combination behaviors required for an exploration strategy. Through 
its combination of hR practices, the engineering hR system supports knowl-
edge workers’ AMOs to conduct a broad search for diverse and unique 
knowledge that can be absorbed and combined to drive new technological 
directions. Further, the practices in this system help to increase access to 
additional unique knowledge from outside the firm through diverse knowl-
edge networks in the professional community. The practices in the engi-
neering hR system foster a climate in which core knowledge workers are 
more likely to experiment, connect knowledge in new ways, and challenge 
the status quo—all essential knowledge-search and -combination behaviors 
for success in exploration.
In contrast, many of the knowledge behaviors elicited by the engineering 
hR system are likely to be inefficient—and potentially counterproductive—
in firms pursuing an exploitation strategy. For example, attracting a broad 
range of specialized knowledge to the organization is costly, both in terms of 
the immediate labor cost associated with the talent and the longer-term 
costs of socialization and retention. Firms seeking to merely extend existing 
technological directions through exploitation are unlikely to recover these 
costs or generate returns through this selection approach because such 
firms have little need for unique and non-overlapping knowledge (Smith et al. 
2005). In addition, the engineering hR system is likely to cause significant 
waste in terms of employees’ time and efforts because employees under this 
system use their individual discretion to follow new search strategies, pursue 
new paths, and question current directions and the status quo—activities 
that are likely to detract from the goals of refining existing processes and 
making predictable incremental advances along current paths (nickerson 
and Zenger 2004).
Hypothesis 1: The engineering hR system will be positively related to firm performance 
for firms pursuing an exploration strategy and negatively related to firm performance 
for firms pursuing an exploitation strategy.
317hR STRATEgy, InnOvATIOn, AnD FIRM PERFORMAncE
Bureaucratic HR System
The philosophical approach underlying the bureaucratic hR system empha-
sizes the employment of a workforce with a narrow range of skills and expe-
rience equipped to fill specific task requirements governed by formal rules 
and performance management (Baron and hannan 2002). Specifically, 
selection decisions support a “buy” approach to hiring external applicants 
who have a tightly defined range of abilities to immediately perform in spec-
ified roles (Baron et al. 1996). Firms following the bureaucratic hR system 
seek to attract and motivate employees by providing competitive compensa-
tion relative to industry rivals and by closely tying pay to individual perfor-
mance. Formal coordination and control are achieved through tight 
controls by management in the form of rigorous documentation, reporting 
structures, and regularly scheduled performance evaluations conducted by 
management (Baron and hannan 2002). The hR practices in the bureau-
cratic hR system foster a formal structured work environment that rewards 
employees’ mastery of institutionalized routines and use of relevant knowl-
edge within the boundaries of well-defined job roles and expectations.
we argue that the bureaucratic hR system promotes unique knowledge-
worker AMOs that support knowledge-search and -combination behaviors 
that are aligned with the exploitation strategy and misaligned with the explo-
ration strategy. First, the practices in this hR system work together to support 
the exchange of knowledge stocks that are local and/or related to the orga-
nization’s existing knowledge base in the pursuit of incremental change. By 
hiring for the immediate fit to organizational tasks and focusing on employ-
ees with relevant industry experience, firms employing the bureaucratic hR 
system are likely to assemble a workforce with strong external network ties to 
other firms or relevant actors (e.g., customers and suppliers) in their indus-
try (hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and Kochhar 2001). These external ties create 
the opportunities for knowledge workers to gain access to new knowledge on 
process and technological improvements at competitor and peer organiza-
tions that, based on industry-specific standards, are likely be closely related 
to the firm’s existing technological direction (Song et al. 2003).
Formal structural control tied to managerial direction and feedback in the 
bureaucratic hR system increases the importance of managers for identify-
ing exchange opportunities in this context and leads to knowledge-search 
and -combination behavior that is oriented toward solving moderately com-
plex problems (nickerson and Zenger 2004) such as the improvement and 
modification of current technology. Further, organizations employing the 
bureaucratic hR system encourage employees to complete their work within 
the boundaries defined by formal organizational rules and under the close 
guidance and support of a designated superior. Because of this direct super-
vision and oversight, employees are likely to be motivated to accomplish 
supervisor-espoused goals (i.e., as opposed to disparate goals identified and 
embraced by individual employees), which is likely to reinforce the standard-
ization of routines and formalization of roles in which existing organizational 
knowledge becomes embedded (Benner and Tushman 2003).
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Overall, these arguments suggest that the bureaucratic hR system is posi-
tively aligned with the requirements of an exploitation strategy. The selection 
practices in the bureaucratic hR system create a core of knowledge workers 
with stocks of knowledge that are highly overlapping in terms of education, 
training, and work experience. Further, the external focus on talent acquisi-
tion constrained to tightly defined capabilities supports knowledge flows that 
help the organization gain access to new knowledge that is highly related to 
existing knowledge in the organization. These practices contribute to knowl-
edge workers’ advanced knowledge of industry standards, familiarity with the 
industry’s products, and an understanding of common industry routines. 
Knowledge that is deep and narrow facilitates employees’ abilities to integrate 
knowledge that is likely to be closely related to the current technological 
directions of the firm and promote incremental improvements and innova-
tions in existing product lines (he and wong 2012). Finally, practices in this 
system motivate employees to engage in knowledge-search behaviors that fol-
low current routines, ensuring that employees contribute their knowledge to 
the improvement of current technological pursuits rather than focusing on 
new paradigms (Burns and Stalker 1994).
By contrast, the hR practices within the bureaucratic hR system are likely 
to lead to knowledge-search and -combination behaviors that are misaligned 
with the knowledge requirements of the exploration strategy. For example, 
a focus on hiring talent from the external market with tightly overlapping 
knowledge and experience reduces the introduction of the broad and 
unique knowledge required to create novel combinations of knowledge for 
exploratory innovation. In addition, the direct linkage of pay to individual 
performance decreases trust and decreases employees’ motivation to share 
unique knowledge with one another (collins and Smith 2006). control 
through tight process and managerial oversight is less useful for solving 
complex problems because this formal hierarchy reduces the horizontal 
communication and exchange that facilitate the use of diverse perspectives 
and approaches to solving complex problems (nickerson and Zenger 2004). 
Finally, tight controls and processes also reduce the likelihood of employ-
ees’ pushing against the status quo or challenging industry standards 
because employees are likely to receive negative feedback for breaking stan-
dard procedures or protocols under a bureaucratic hR approach.
Hypothesis 2: The bureaucratic hR system will be positively related to firm performance 
for firms pursuing an exploitation strategy and negatively related to firm performance 
for firms pursuing an exploration strategy.
Commitment HR System
The philosophical approach underlying the commitment hR system is to 
create a work environment characterized by employee loyalty, close-knit 
internal ties, and a long-term employment relationship with the organiza-
tion. In prior studies of high-technology firms, authors have articulated that 
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the commitment hR system is composed of three distinct groups of hR 
practices: 1) selection based on a “build” approach to hiring individuals 
who fit the organization’s culture and who can grow with the firm over time, 
2) attracting and motivating employees based on building a strong internal 
community and family-like environment, and 3) autonomous coordination 
and control through peer feedback and strong cultural norms and individ-
ual employee discretion (Baron et al. 1996; collins and Smith 2006). Spe-
cifically, the commitment hR system includes external selection practices 
oriented to assess individuals’ fit to the organizational values and culture 
and a focus on the internal labor market for promotions (collins and Smith 
2006). This system emphasizes peer and cultural control, relying on cultural 
norms to provide guidance for individuals who have high discretion in com-
pleting tasks (Baron et al. 1996). Finally, the commitment hR system creates 
greater attachment and embeddedness through a family-like environment, 
internal growth opportunities, and pay and rewards tied to organizational 
performance (collins and Smith 2006).
we argue that the commitment hR system promotes unique knowledge-
worker AMOs that support knowledge-search and -combination behaviors 
that are required for effective exploitation but detrimental for exploration. 
First, the hR practices in the commitment hR system are likely to create a 
context that encourages employees to build high levels of firm-specific and 
overlapping knowledge. Specifically, the commitment hR system focuses on 
fostering a long-standing employee-employer relationship, resulting in 
greater commitment and a much lower turnover than alternative hR systems. 
This increased commitment and incentive to maintain the employer-employee 
relationship increase employees’ willingness to develop firm-specific knowl-
edge (Tsui et al. 1997). low turnover rates over a sustained period are likely 
to result in overlapping knowledge stocks and beliefs about work processes 
among long-tenured workers (Schneider, goldstein, and Smith 1995). Finally, 
internal labor markets and job rotations in this system reinforce a narrow 
range of overlapping knowledge among core knowledge workers because 
they build new knowledge by training under more experienced employees 
and through experiences working on the organization’s existing products.
The attachment and control components of the commitment hR system 
further shape the knowledge-search, -exchange, and -combination behav-
iors of the core knowledge workers. For example, the high levels of organi-
zational commitment resulting from this system of practices increases 
employees’ willingness to invest effort to support the strategic direction of 
the organization (Tsui et al. 1997). Because employees are hired based on 
their fit to the firm’s culture and values, they are more likely to direct this 
effort toward incremental change rather than toward significant transfor-
mation that could change the firm and their employment relationship 
(Schneider et al. 1995). The commitment hR system’s reliance on fostering 
a family-like environment and peer feedback to maintain coordination and 
control are likely to further increase employees’ motivation to follow exist-
ing rules and norms. In particular, the strong ties that develop among actors 
in close proximity can lead to emotional convergence (Anderson, Keltner, 
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and John 2003) and a climate of continuing the status quo because individ-
uals hesitate to challenge one another for fear of jeopardizing their rela-
tionships (granovetter 1973).
Based on this, we argue that the commitment hR system is aligned to 
promote the knowledge-search and -combination behaviors that are 
required to successfully support the exploitation strategy. First, employees’ 
overlapping and deep firm-specific knowledge is likely to aid in creating 
knowledge-recombination opportunities for the incremental improvement 
of existing products (he and wong 2012). Extensive organizational experi-
ence is also likely to foster knowledge workers’ understanding of existing 
routines, best practices, and technological knowledge that already exists in 
the organization (Kehoe and collins 2008), increasing the efficiency of 
incremental improvements required for exploitation. The investment in 
internal development and an internal labor market are likely to increase 
knowledge search based on existing internal knowledge because this hR 
system increases employees’ reliance on internal network ties when they 
seek to understand a problem, seek new knowledge, or gain new perspec-
tives (collins and Smith 2006). Because of the overlapping nature of this 
knowledge, employees are likely to be able to absorb the knowledge and 
information shared with other internal employees easily, and the resulting 
recombination of knowledge is likely to lead to incremental changes in the 
technological direction of the organization (Baum et al. 2000).
In contrast, the role behaviors supported by the commitment hR system 
are likely to be counterproductive for an exploration strategy. First, low 
turnover and a focus on employees’ internal networks are likely to result in 
reduced flows of new and diverse knowledge into the organization, reduc-
ing the likelihood that core knowledge workers will have access to broad, 
diverse knowledge in their search activities. Further, because core knowl-
edge workers will be more motivated to develop higher levels of firm- 
specific knowledge, they may find absorbing and integrating different and 
unique external knowledge challenging even if it were brought into the 
organization (cohen and levinthal 1990). Strong cultural norms and 
attachment to the organization are likely to decrease the likelihood of 
employees’ challenging the status quo because they will be unwilling to dis-
rupt their status in the organization or risk backlash from other employees 
(Barker 1993); thus, employees under this system will be unlikely to chal-
lenge the current technological direction of the organization.
Hypothesis 3: The commitment hR system will be positively related to firm performance 
for firms pursuing an exploitation strategy and negatively related to firm performance 
for firms pursuing an exploration strategy.
Methods
Overview of the Research Process
we collected data from knowledge-based organizations in a single industry—
software—to reduce error variance based on systematic differences across 
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industries. we chose the software industry because firms in this context are 
likely to use a variety of approaches for managing core employees (Baron et al. 
1996), and managing these knowledge workers effectively can have a signifi-
cant impact on firm performance (collins and Smith 2006). To test our 
hypotheses, we measured four broad sets of variables: hR practices, innovation 
strategy, firm performance, and controls. To limit problems associated with 
common method variance, we collected measures of our variables from three 
data sources: surveys from a sample of core knowledge workers to assess hR 
practices, interviews with chief executive officers (cEOs) to collect background 
data for control variables and to assess innovation strategy, and publicly avail-
able corporate financial performance records for the one-year period follow-
ing our collection of data on hR practices and innovation strategy.
Sample and Research Procedures
we collected data from 230 software firms in four high-technology regions 
(Austin, Texas; Boston, Massachusetts; Seattle, washington; and northern 
virginia). we limited our focus to firms with public financial information 
who employed at least 100 employees to target firms that were likely to have 
formally established hR systems. Of the 439 firms that met our sample crite-
ria, 251 agreed to participate. From these, we obtained usable data from 230 
organizations, representing a 52.4% response rate. The organizations that 
participated did not differ from nonparticipating firms in reported sales 
(t439 = 0.89 [not significant (n.s.)]), profit growth (t439 = 1.41 [n.s.]), return 
on equity (t439 = 1.26 [n.s.]), or number of employees (t439 = 1.04 [n.s.]). 
The mean firm size was 260.45 employees, with a standard deviation of 
109.07 and a range of 152 to 689 employees.
Our communication with each sample firm began with a brief phone 
interview with the cEO to provide details on the study’s purpose and proce-
dures, collect background information on the organization, and build the 
cEO’s commitment to participating in the study. we asked the cEO to pro-
vide us with the e-mail addresses of 20 core knowledge workers, defined as 
employees “who are critical for creating software and product innovations 
within your organization.” we then sent each of the identified employees an 
initial request and one reminder, with a link to a secure website and a request 
to complete a survey. To increase participation in the firms, we asked the 
cEO of each participating firm to send the identified employees an e-mail 
encouraging their participation. we provided cEOs with information on the 
total number (but not the names) of the employees who responded. An aver-
age of 12.3 core knowledge workers completed surveys at each organization, 
with a range of 6 to 18 respondents and an overall internal participation rate 
of 64%. Respondents held the following job titles: 37% were software engi-
neers, 31% were software developers, 29% were software programmers, and 
3% were new-product project managers. The job titles suggest that our 
respondents held jobs directly related to knowledge creation.
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Variables
Firm Performance
we employed two separate measures of financial performance and obtained 
financial performance measures through publicly available sources. First, 
because the goal of most publicly traded firms is year-over-year profit growth, 
we measured the one-year profit growth as the net profit for the firm one 
year after we collected the survey data (t + 1) minus the net profit for the 
year concurrent with the survey data collection (t) and then divided this 
total by the net profit for the year concurrent with the survey data collection 
(t). Second, to evaluate firms’ abilities to provide value to their shareholders 
through effective innovation, we measured the return on equity (ROE), 
defined as the net income divided by shareholder equity, for the one-year 
fiscal period following the collection of our survey data. To make the results 
easier to read in our tables and easier to interpret, we transformed each 
performance measure into percentages by multiplying each by 100.
HR Practices
we used previous research on high-technology firms and developed or 
adapted 23 items to assess hR practices reflecting the three components—
attachment, selection, and coordination and control—underlying the dif-
ferences among the engineering, bureaucratic, and commitment hR 
systems (Baron et al. 1999; collins and Smith 2006). Employees were asked 
the extent to which they agreed that survey statements matched the hR 
practices of their organization on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“totally 
disagree”) to 5 (“totally agree”); see Table 3 for all survey statements. For 
attachment, the statements focused on 1) challenging work, 2) growth 
opportunities and social and monetary connections to the organization, 
and 3) high pay and pay tied to individual performance. For selection, state-
ments focused on attracting employees based on 1) fit to the organization’s 
culture and values as opposed to an immediate fit to the job and task 
requirements and 2) focus on external as opposed to internal labor mar-
kets. For coordination and control, statements focused on 1) professional 
standards and personal discretion, 2) feedback from peers, and 3) tight 
monitoring and control by direct supervisors.
To provide evidence of the discriminant validity of our three systems, we 
performed a principal components analysis with a varimax rotation to exam-
ine the factor structure of the 23 items representing hR practices. In our 
preliminary analysis, two of the items failed to cleanly load on any of the 
three factors that emerge and were dropped from further analyses. The sec-
ond principal components analysis on the remaining 21 items yielded three 
components with eigenvalues greater than 1 (see Table 3 for details). Items 
in each of the three factors closely mapped to our descriptions of the hR 
practices tied to each of the three systems, providing evidence of the 
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discriminant validity of three separate hR systems.2 Although a few hR 
practices demonstrated modest factor loadings across the three systems, this 
is not cause for concern for two reasons: First, all primary factor loadings 
were at the 0.50 level or greater, and second, hR-system measures can be 
better understood as additive indices than as scales reflecting underlying 
constructs (e.g., Batt and colvin 2011; chadwick et al. 2013). A factor analy-
sis is useful in demonstrating the tendency for practices in a system to be 
used together and for establishing discriminant validity of the three systems, 
but we would not necessarily expect item factor loadings to reach conven-
tional levels. Items for each of the three scales showed good reliability: engi-
neering hR system, α = 0.76; bureaucratic hR system, α = 0.78; and 
commitment hR system, α = 0.71. Following standard practice in the ShRM 
literature (e.g., Delery 1998; Batt 2002; collins and Smith 2006), we created 
hR-system measures by averaging the hR-practice items separately for each 
of the hR systems.
Innovation Strategy
As previously noted, firms may pursue different innovation strategies and 
tend to focus primarily on either exploration or exploitation (March 1991; 
Baum et al. 2000). we captured each firm’s innovation strategy by asking 
the cEO to identify whether the firm more closely followed a strategy of 
exploration (focusing on trying to create new products) or exploitation 
(focusing on incrementally improving current products) (he and wong 
2012). To create meaningful interaction terms in our moderated regression 
analyses, we coded firms that cEOs identified as explorers as 1 and those 
that cEOs identified as exploiters as 2. To provide some evidence of validity 
for this approach, we also asked the cEO to provide an assessment of the 
percentage of the total revenue sourced in prior years from 1) existing 
products, 2) a new version of an existing product, and 3) brand-new prod-
ucts. we then created a ratio of innovativeness by dividing the percentage of 
revenue listed in source 3 by 100. we found a correlation of 0.65 with our 
coded firm-strategy variable based on a subsample of 197 companies for 
which the cEO was willing to provide this additional information. Thus, 
those firms that were cEO-identified as explorers appear to have obtained a 
larger percentage of their revenue from new products in prior years.
 2confirmatory factor analysis (cFA) provided similar evidence of the validity of the three separate hR 
systems. Specifically, we found that a three-factor model (items consistent with our principal components 
analysis) showed a good fit to the data: χ2 = 826.2 (degrees of freedom [df]) = 189, p < 0.01), RMSEA 
(root mean square error of approximation) = 0.07, cFI (comparative fit index) = 0.85, IFI (incremental 
fit index) = 0.86. Further, a three-factor model showed a significantly better fit to the data than did a one-
factor model (all hR items loading on a single higher-order factor): χ2 = 2224.6 (df = 189, 
p < 0.01), RMSEA = 0.18, cFI = 0.39, IFI = 0.38. Also, the three-factor model showed slightly better fit than 
a three-factor model in which the three factors were allowed to correlate with one another: χ2 = 917.4 
(df = 186, p < 0.01), RMSEA = 0.07, cFI = 0.82, IFI = 0.84. The standardized factor loadings in the cFA 
model with the three uncorrelated hR system factors were similar in nature to what we found in the pat-
tern matrix after rotation using the principal components analysis.
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Table 3. Exploratory Factor Analysis for hR Practices
HR practices
Engineering  
HR system
Commitment  
HR system
Bureaucratic  
HR system
A. Selection
we focus on external hiring for employees based on the fit 
of their skills to the requirements of specific jobs.
0.438 0.347 0.637
we tend to hire people who can contribute immediately in 
their job without extensive training.
0.441 0.297 0.597
we select individuals based on their overall fit with the 
company’s values.
0.382 0.704 0.344
when interviewing for new employees, the company focuses 
on how well the individual fits our culture.
0.357 0.698 0.378
In this company, we focus on hiring from within as the 
primary way to fill higher-level jobs.
0.298 0.741 0.435
This company uses elite sources (e.g., top universities, head 
hunters) to find the best available talent in the country.
0.631 0.381 0.344
higher-level positions are filled primarily through a broad 
external search for the best and brightest employees.
0.587 0.297 0.386
B. Attachment
we attract and retain employees primarily by paying higher 
wages than our competitors.
0.348 0.297 0.597
we primarily rely on pay raises and individual bonuses to 
motivate employees.
0.423 0.311 0.565
we motivate employees by creating a strong social 
environment at work.
0.404 0.631 0.288
we motivate employees through company performance-
based bonuses (e.g., profit sharing or gain sharing).
0.397 0.578 0.304
we motivate employees by providing interesting and 
challenging work.
0.687 0.321 0.299
we retain employees by challenging them to stay on the 
cutting edge of technology.
0.669 0.314 0.298
we provide opportunities for employees to grow and learn 
in their jobs.
0.561 0.487 0.118
C. Coordination and control  
we ask managers to closely monitor the day-to-day activities 
of their employees.
−0.114 0.297 0.588
Managers follow a regular schedule in completing 
performance evaluations on employees.
0.346 0.208 0.556
This company has formal job duties and descriptions so that 
employees know their roles and responsibilities.
0.241 0.311 0.602
Employees in this company are expected to track one 
another’s work, effort, and compliance with the company 
culture.
0.408 0.523 0.211
we expect employees to provide informal feedback to one 
another in an effort to improve performance.
0.423 0.597 0.148
we believe that employees are experts who will get the job 
done right the first time without direct oversight.
0.622 0.404 0.206
Employees in this company are given the opportunity to 
complete their work however they see fit.
0.623 0.451 –0.118
Eigenvalue 3.72 3.08 4.28
Notes: Boldface numbers show best alignment to the different hR systems and practices.
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Control Variables
we sought to account for the differences in challenges or advantages that 
firms might experience in managing their workforce, responding to changes 
in the environment; successfully leveraging employee knowledge and capa-
bilities; and, more broadly, driving profits and creating returns for share-
holders by controlling for organizational size (measured as the total number 
of employees), prior firm performance (measured as the total sales the year 
of the survey data collection) and age of firm (measured as the total num-
ber of years the organization had been operating as an independent com-
pany). we divided the firm size by 100 to ease the interpretation of relevant 
findings, and we multiplied sales growth by 100 to create a percentage. Fur-
ther, prior research suggested that software/technology firms may seek to 
co-locate geographically to share resources, build local labor markets, or 
collaborate. To control for potential differences in resources, hR practices, 
labor markets, or performance based on co-location, we added three 
dummy controls for the regions of the organizations that participated (com-
paring the firms based in Austin, Boston, and Seattle to those in northern 
virginia).
Results
we provide descriptive statistics and correlations for the key variables in 
Table 4. As we can see in this table, the three hR systems are all significantly 
and negatively correlated with one another, providing evidence that firms 
choose to implement one of the three hR systems to manage their core 
knowledge workers. we tested our model using ordinary least squares 
regression analysis by entering the variables in three steps: the control vari-
ables, the independent and moderator variables, and the interaction terms. 
In Table 5, models 1 to 3 display the results for regression analyses predict-
ing profit growth, and models 4 to 6 display the results for regression analy-
ses predicting ROE. As shown in Table 5, models 2 and 5, the main effects of 
all three hR systems are nonsignificant in predicting firm performance, 
which is consistent with our expectation that the effectiveness of any hR 
system in driving performance depends on its alignment with an organiza-
tion’s strategy.
In hypothesis 1, we predict that the engineering hR system is positively 
related to firm performance in firms pursuing an exploration strategy and 
negatively related to performance in firms pursuing an exploitation strategy. 
In Table 5, model 3, the Engineering hR system*Strategy interaction term is 
significantly related to profit growth (β = −6.83; p < 0.01). A simple slopes 
analysis reveals that the underlying relationship is consistent with our predic-
tion. Specifically, the engineering hR system is positively related to profit 
growth in firms pursuing an exploration strategy (β = 2.94; p < 0.05) and neg-
atively related to profit growth in firms pursuing an exploitation strategy (β = 
−4.10; p < 0.01). A plot of this interaction appears in Figure 1. Model 6 reflects 
that the Engineering hR system*Strategy interaction term is also significant 
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in predicting the ROE (β = −5.07; p < 0.01). A simple slopes analysis suggests 
that the positive relationship between the engineering hR system and ROE is 
marginally significant in the context of an exploration strategy (β = 2.37; p < 
0.10), whereas a negative relationship between the engineering hR system 
and ROE is significant in the context of an exploitation strategy (β = −2.82; p 
< 0.05). These findings provide support for hypothesis 1.
In hypothesis 2, we predict that the bureaucratic hR system is positively 
related to profit growth and ROE in the context of an exploitation strategy 
and negatively related to profit growth and ROE in the context of an explo-
ration strategy. In Table 5, model 3, the Bureaucratic hR system*Strategy 
interaction term is significantly related to profit growth (β = 10.41; p < 0.01). 
A simple slopes analysis reveals that the underlying relationship is consistent 
with our prediction. Specifically, the bureaucratic hR system is positively 
related to profit growth in firms pursuing an exploitation strategy (β = 4.62; 
p < 0.01) and negatively related to profit growth in firms pursuing an explo-
ration strategy (β = −5.55; p < 0.01). A plot of this interaction appears in 
Figure 2. Table 5, model 6 shows that the Bureaucratic hR system*Strategy 
interaction term is also significant in predicting the ROE (β = 8.29; p < 0.01), 
and a simple slopes analysis confirms that the underlying relationship con-
forms to our predictions. The bureaucratic hR system has a positive effect 
on ROE in firms pursuing an exploitation strategy (β = 4.84; p < 0.01) and a 
negative effect on ROE in firms pursuing an exploration strategy (β = −4.52; 
p < 0.01); thus, we find strong support for hypothesis 2.
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In hypothesis 3, we predict that the commitment hR system is positively 
related to firm performance in firms pursuing an exploitation strategy and 
negatively related to performance in firms pursuing an exploration strategy. 
As shown in Table 5, models 3 and 6, the commitment hR system*Strategy 
interaction term is not significantly related to profit growth (β = 2.97 [n.s.]) 
or ROE (β = 2.60 [n.s.]). In combination with the lack of significant main 
effect of the commitment hR system on profit growth and ROE, these 
results suggest that, relative to the engineering hR system and bureaucratic 
hR system, the commitment hR system is not well aligned with the strategic 
requirement of either an exploration or an exploitation strategy. These 
results provide no support for hypothesis 3.
we conducted several additional sets of analyses to examine the robust-
ness of our initial findings.3 First, we examined the robustness of our find-
ings when using an alternative measure of innovation in which we captured 
a firm’s relative pursuit of exploration (not exploitation) as the cEO-
reported percentage of revenue from brand-new products in prior years. 
Results of regression analyses in which we interacted our measures of the 
three hR systems and this alternative innovation strategy measure produced 
results that are similar to our reported findings in terms of direction, effect 
size, and significance for each of the three interactions. Second, to further 
examine the idea that firms tend to choose one of the three hR systems to 
manage their core knowledge workers, we conducted a cluster analysis on 
the hR-practice items and found that the companies in the sample clus-
tered into one of three clusters. The hR practices for each cluster matched 
our theorized hR systems and the practice groupings that we identified 
when we performed the principal components analysis. Further, results 
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 3The full results of the additional analyses are available upon request.
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from regressions in which we interacted the innovation strategy with dummy 
variables representing these hR clusters (i.e., the engineering cluster com-
pared to the commitment and bureaucratic clusters, the bureaucratic clus-
ter compared to the engineering and commitment clusters) produced 
results similar to our original regression analyses. That is, the engineering 
cluster (compared to the other two hR-system clusters) is positively and sig-
nificantly related to firm performance under exploration, and is negatively 
and significantly related to performance under exploitation. In contrast, 
the bureaucratic cluster (compared to the other two hR-system clusters) is 
positively and significantly related to firm performance under exploitation, 
and is negatively and significantly related to performance under explora-
tion. Thus, both additional sets of analyses provide evidence of the robust-
ness of our initial findings.
Discussion
Overall, our study makes substantive contributions to the ShRM literature. 
First, we have brought forward the idea of strategic choice in managing core 
knowledge workers and examined the use and relative effectiveness of three 
alternative strategic hR systems. Despite repeated calls for researchers to 
examine alternative systems for managing talent (e.g., Becker and huselid 
2006; Kehoe and collins 2008), most prior research in this vein has focused 
on a single, best practices approach to hR management. At best, prior 
research seeking to address the fit hypothesis compared the effectiveness of 
a strategic hR approach against a nonstrategic approach that simply elimi-
nates investment in employees (e.g., Arthur 1994; Delery and Doty 1996). 
Based on the earlier work of Baron and colleagues (Baron et al. 1996; Baron 
and hannan 2002), we identified three hR systems that align with alterna-
tive philosophies for how firms seek to select, attach, coordinate and control 
core knowledge workers. Significantly, results from a principal components 
analysis suggest that organizational respondents see these hR systems as sep-
arate approaches for how their firm manages core knowledge workers. Our 
measures of alternative hR systems are significantly negatively correlated 
with one another, suggesting that firms primarily choose to manage core 
knowledge workers using one strategic hR approach. By examining the rela-
tive effectiveness of these three alternative approaches simultaneously, our 
work advances ShRM research by providing evidence that firms do seem to 
make choices among strategic approaches to managing core knowledge 
workers; this suggests that the assessment of multiple hR systems in different 
strategic and industry contexts is necessary in future ShRM scholarship.
we also add to the ShRM literature by theorizing about and finding sup-
port for the idea that the choice of hR systems by firms is important for 
understanding competitive advantage and performance under alternative 
strategies. Our work sheds light on the role of the fit between hR systems and 
organizational strategies in predicting firm competitive advantage. ShRM 
scholars have argued that hR systems lead to higher firm performance when 
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they elicit the employee outcomes that are required to effectively execute a 
firm’s strategy; however, extant empirical research has provided little in the 
way of evidence to support this hypothesis, with most research finding that a 
best practices hR system works better than a nonstrategic set of low-investment 
practices across generic business strategies. In contrast, we argue that the 
choice of hR systems matters for shaping the knowledge behaviors required 
by specific innovation strategies. we find that the engineering hR system is 
the best fit for firms pursuing exploration because it is the only system that 
interacts positively with the exploration strategy in predicting performance. 
we also found that the bureaucratic hR system is the best fit for firms pursu-
ing an exploitation strategy because it is the only system to interact positively 
with exploitation in predicting performance.
Furthermore, much of the earlier work on fit in ShRM has focused solely 
on the positive fit between hR systems and strategy and has largely ignored 
the consequences of negative fit or misalignment. In contrast, we also pro-
posed and found empirical support for the notion that misalignment of hR 
systems with the behavioral needs of an innovation strategy can lead to per-
formance penalties. As hypothesized, we find that the high use of the engi-
neering hR system is negatively related to performance for firms pursuing 
exploitation, and the use of the bureaucratic hR system is negatively related 
to performance for firms pursuing exploration. The combination of theo-
rizing and empirical results suggest that careful choice of hR systems is also 
important because misalignment seems to result in performance penalties.
Interestingly, in our regression analyses, we do not find significant inter-
actions between innovation strategy and the commitment hR system in pre-
dicting performance, and we also do not find a significant main effect in the 
relationship between the commitment hR system and firm performance. 
These results are particularly surprising given the many studies that have 
found a positive and significant relationship between a commitment hR 
system and firm performance across a wide range of industries. Possibly the 
other hR systems that we examine here are simply better strategic fits in the 
context of exploration and exploitation. That is, the commitment hR sys-
tem is not negatively related to performance under either innovation strat-
egy; however, the engineering and bureaucratic hR systems are better fits 
for exploration and exploitation, respectively, and firms pursuing these hR 
strategies under the right innovation strategy are the ones likely to achieve 
competitive advantage. Or perhaps the software industry, with its high 
degree of volatility and rapidly changing competitive landscape, may not be 
a fit for commitment-orientated practices that focus on internal labor mar-
kets and building a long-tenured employee base. Possibly, the practices in 
this hR system limit the flow of new knowledge and employee willingness to 
challenge the status quo in a way that makes keeping pace with competitors 
in an effective way difficult for software companies.
As with all research, our study should be considered in light of its limita-
tions. First, we examined these relationships over a relatively short period of 
time in smaller firms that were probably pursuing only a single innovation 
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strategy. Thus, our research is not able to address questions of alignment 
between hR systems and innovation strategy for firms that are changing 
their innovation strategy or for larger multidivisional firms seeking to achieve 
ambidexterity through the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploita-
tion. Prior research has suggested that quickly changing hR systems and 
control structures is difficult for firms (Baron et al. 1999; nickerson and Sil-
verman 2003), increasing the potential for misalignment for firms or indus-
tries subject to frequent or rapid changes in strategic directions. Further, 
some research has suggested that firms may employ multiple hR systems 
simultaneously across different employee groups (e.g., lepak and Snell 
1999). Future research may seek to determine whether firms can successfully 
support multiple innovations strategies in different parts of the organization 
through both structural and hR-system choices (e.g., splitting the organiza-
tion into multiple units to pursue different innovation strategies and align-
ing hR systems to drive the required knowledge behaviors in each unit).
Second, unmeasured exogenous variables may affect the relationships we 
studied. For example, other organizational characteristics (e.g., attributes 
of the firms’ founders or current leadership) may explain the differences in 
firms’ choice of innovation strategy and hR system. we did control for a 
number of firm characteristics that could potentially affect choice of strate-
gic direction and hR philosophy and systems (e.g., prior financial perfor-
mance, firm size, and firm age), thereby reducing some of these concerns. 
Alternatively, we may be violating assumptions underlying ordinary least 
squares regression analysis (e.g., normality of errors) if a leader has chosen 
an hR system based on the earlier selection of an innovation strategy. Our 
correlation analysis suggests that no significant correlation exists between 
the innovation strategy and hR system, suggesting that firms in our sample 
probably chose these strategies independently, providing some mitigation 
of this concern. Future research will benefit from the inclusion of additional 
firm characteristics in comparisons of the effectiveness of different hR sys-
tems or from following an instrumental variables approach to reduce con-
cerns regarding endogeneity between innovation and hR strategies. 
Similarly, future research can further explicate the relationships among hR 
systems, innovation strategies, and firm performance by measuring and 
evaluating the impact of employee ability, motivation, opportunity out-
comes, and resulting knowledge behaviors that we identified in this study.
Despite these limitations, our study’s contributions are bolstered by sev-
eral key strengths. First, we collected data on hR systems, innovation strate-
gies, and firm performance from independent sources, including knowledge 
workers, cEOs, and corporate records. This research design buffers our 
results against common method bias, lending additional credence to our 
findings. Second, our use of lagged performance data reinforces the causal 
direction specified in our model. Finally, in the context of extant ShRM 
scholarship, which has focused primarily on the effects of the high-commitment 
hR system, our assessment of alternative hR systems provides guidance for 
future ShRM research as the field forges ahead, beyond the traditional best 
practices approach.
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In conclusion, our study pushes theorizing and thinking on the knowledge-
based view and ShRM to better understand how firms may foster the knowl-
edge-search and -combination behaviors required by alternative innovation 
strategies. Our findings suggest that multiple hR systems exist across knowl-
edge-based firms in the same industry and that the alignment or misalign-
ment of these systems with the knowledge requirements of exploration and 
exploitation strategies can lead to performance gains or penalties. In light 
of these findings, leaders of software and other knowledge-based firms that 
depend on innovation should carefully choose an hR system that elicits the 
knowledge behaviors that fit the requirements of their innovation strategy. 
Although the leaders of knowledge-based firms probably spend a great deal 
of time thinking about external market opportunities and developing an 
innovation strategy that they feel best takes advantage of these opportuni-
ties, many of these leaders may not spend as much time thinking about 
crafting an hR system that effectively shapes the capabilities and behaviors 
of their workforce. Indeed, as firms grow larger, cEOs tend to pass this 
responsibility on to hR executives, potentially increasing the chances that 
the organization will implement an hR strategy that fails to elicit the knowledge-
search and -combination behaviors that best align with the requirements of 
the business (innovation) strategy. As such, our study sheds light on the 
choices that hR executives or cEOs may consider in determining how to 
best align the characteristics of their workforce with the strategic innovation 
goals of the organization.
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